Speculation in early 1970s Britain: A distorted
Economy.
Abstract
In 1971
the Bank of England made changes to the banking system that freed the major high-street
banks from quantitative controls and restrictions on credit creation. In March
1972, the Conservative Government substituted a free-market economic policy for
one that employed loose monetary and easy fiscal policy to encourage investment
into industry. Over the following twenty months capital moved heavily into the
property market, fuelled by the easier credit conditions, and investment into
industry notably dropped. Edward Heath blamed the Bank of England for the
distortion in the economy and many in the City criticised the Government for
naïve economic management. This paper uniquely examines the property boom and
subsequent bust in a wider context. Changes to planning permission,
developments in the lease- hold market and new taxation in the earlier two
decades also contributed to a volatile property market. In particular, inflation
altered expectations for asset prices and engendered fear of holding cash. The
end of the boom amid soaring interest rates witnessed a collapse of the
secondary banking sector and extraordinary pressure on the primary, main-stream
banks. Understanding the period and assignation of blame have to be considered
in the context of changes in the property market from the mid- 1950s, policy mistakes
made by previous Governments and an embedded British culture of property
investment and ownership.
Source: Nationwide (property) and Office for National
Statistics (retail price index)
7
|
|
Conservative Party Policy
1970-1972
|
7
|
Macroeconomic Background
|
10
|
March 1972 Budget
|
13
|
|
|
2. The Secondary Banking Sector and changes in the Money- Markets
|
15
|
Competition and Credit Control
|
16
|
3. The Property Market: 1955-1970
|
18
|
Property Data
|
18
|
Commercial Property
|
19
|
Residential Property
|
23
|
4. Property, Inflation and the
|
25
|
Political Economy: 1970-1973
|
|
|
|
Shocks to the Property Market
|
25
|
Inflation
|
27
|
Inflation and Property
|
29
|
The Political Economy
|
34
|
Historical examples of Property
Speculation
|
35
|
and Bank Crises
|
|
The Political Economy and the Property
Market
|
35
|
The End of the Bull Market
|
36
|
|
|
5. The Secondary Banking Crisis: 1973 –
1977
|
39
|
|
|
Solution
|
42
|
6. The Property Market: 1974-1976
|
45
|
|
|
Commercial Property
|
45
|
Residential Property
|
47
|
Property unit Trusts
|
48
|
|
|
7. Conclusion
|
49
|
1
Background
Conservative Party 1970-1972
The Conservative party under
Edward Heath was elected in June 1970. Brendan Sewill, special assistant to the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, believed that the Conservatives had a better prepared
and more detailed programme than any previous opposition party.[1] Emphasising “disengagement”
from state control, the Conservatives promised a free- market philosophy, particularly
tax reform, alongside EEC entry and new legislation on industrial relations. Their
economic goal was to be achieved by making the nationalised sector more
efficient, particularly by stopping subsidies to “lame-duck” firms and
abolishing interventionist institutions such as the National Board of Prices
and Incomes (NBPI) and the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC) despite
the Bank of England’s approval of the latter.[2] The Bank believed assistance to modernise
industry would raise productivity and the Governor expressed his regret at the
winding down of the IRC.[3] Plans to stimulate the supply
side of the economy included tax cuts, tax reform and privatisation.
Source: RPI - Office for National Statistics,
Wages - OECD
The Cabinet was keen to
be decisive but the advantage of preparing early for Government in the late1960s
had been offset by the failure to have prioritised price stability.[4] The Conservatives had assumed
that fears of bankruptcy would dampen private-sector wage negotiations, but the
subdued labour market while in opposition changed to over 11.7% annualised wage
inflation in the three years 1969 to 1971, when retail price inflation was only
7% (annualised). Adapting to economic change was further complicated by the
death of the Chancellor, Iain Macleod, in July 1970, a man whose intellectual
and political stature was considered greater than that of his colleagues.[5] The new Chancellor, Anthony Barber, had been
Economic Secretary to the Treasury in 1962-1963 but the value of his experience
was undermined by unfavourable comparisons to Macleod.
The ambition of the Conservative
program was unveiled at the October party conference. Heath promised a “quiet
revolution” to reverse the move towards a collectivist economy overwhelmed by
state intervention.[6]
This had not been intended as a one-term
strategy, but an overall vision of transforming Britain into a modern society. However,
Heath had allowed himself to be identified with aggressively free-market
beliefs which were not necessarily his own and in some cases alien to him. The philosophy
created support from the right wing of the party but alienated the Trade Unions
whose assent would become necessary in the future.[7]
The strategy of disengagement was immediately
undermined in November 1970 when the Aviation Minister gave £42 million of
state aid to Rolls Royce. By February 1971 the company was insolvent and the Government,
fearing wide spread unemployment, nationalised it citing its importance to defence
as an exceptional circumstance.[8] Rolls Royce was engaged in
building the RB211 engine for the United States’ Lockheed Corporation and
possibly foreign policy, along-side unemployment and defence considerations, influenced
the rescue. The Government’s credibility weakened further in April and June the
following year, when they subsidised the new owners of the Upper Clyde
Shipbuilders and then mounted the rescue of Belfast shipbuilders Harland and Wolff. Heath was conscious that the electorate had blamed
the Conservatives for high unemployment in the inter-war period, which they had
demonstrated by voting Labour in the1945 landslide, and consequently switched
to employment as the main priority.[9] Following Heath’s U-turn from industrial
disengagement, the Economist dryly noted that one of the worst choices for a
£35m subsidy was shipbuilding “whose future lies in low wage countries.”[10]
The Government’s early loss of
credibility in industry was matched by its failure to implement a coherent
incomes policy. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971 failed to secure wage restraint
because of militant action by the Trade Unions, who used the Act as a pretext
for expressing political hostility to other policies. The Act had aimed to
prevent strikes by codifying collective bargaining to ensure wage agreement,
with the National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) being used in unresolved
disputes. However the NIRC often made surprising decisions when adjudicating
difficult cases turning relatively minor disputes into matters of unnecessary
significance. This often encouraged, rather than prevented, strike action.[11]
The
volte-face was clear with the preparation and enactment of the 1972 Industry
Act which allowed Government support for industry, including £5m without
parliamentary approval. Shipbuilding, computers, motorcycles and textiles all
immediately received Government aid as did the poorer, rural regions. The act even
permitted industry to offer share holdings to Government as compensation for
grants, prompting Labour’s Tony Benn to acknowledge with ironic humour the new (Conservative)
Government’s control over the private sector.[12]
Macroeconomic Background
|
1970
|
1971
|
1972
|
1973
|
1974
|
|
% annual increase
|
||||||
GDP (real)
|
2.2
|
1.6
|
3.4
|
5.6
|
-1.7
|
|
Unemployment
|
2.6
|
2.8
|
3.1
|
2.1
|
2.2
|
|
Wages
|
11.6
|
11.7
|
13.7
|
17.0
|
26.4
|
|
RPI
|
6.4
|
9.4
|
7.1
|
9.2
|
16
|
|
M3
|
8.6
|
14.0
|
27.2
|
27.1
|
5.7
|
|
Trade in Goods
|
-18
|
205
|
-736
|
-2,573
|
-5,241
|
|
£ millions
|
Sources: GDP, Unemployment, M3: Economic Trends Supplement (ETAS) 1990,
RPI: Office for National Statistics, Wages, Trade
in Goods: OECD.
Source: Bloomberg
The Conservatives
inherited an economy with a low unemployment rate of 2.6% and positive balance
of payments, but by the end of 1971, the Government’s first full year in
office, the economy had suffered weaker growth (1.6% compared to 2.2% in 1970) with
unemployment soon to rise sharply. In 1972, the current account, which had been
positive due to the Labour Government’s monetary squeeze, started deteriorating
because of the higher volume of imports following the August 1971 dollar
devaluation.[13]
The earlier squeeze had been made necessary by a large overhang of Government
debt and a negative balance of payments up to and following the 1967
devaluation. In 1972, the unadjusted unemployment figure rose above the politically
sensitive 1 million and although the seasonally adjusted figures were more
reliable, the number was considered intolerable.[14] With hindsight the fear of
rising unemployment was partly misplaced. The Bank of England in early June
1972 noted a positive employment trend and expressed more concern about
inflation, but the political pressure
from rising unemployment had broken the Government’s will.[15] When the Chief Constable of
Glasgow feared civil disorder during the militant strike action in shipbuilding
yards, the rescue of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders had become almost inevitable.[16]
Fixed
investment in manufacturing industry: £
millions at 1975 prices
1970
|
4,177
|
|
1971
|
3,898
|
|
1972
|
3,370
|
|
1973
|
3,440
|
|
1974
|
3,782
|
|
1975
|
3,522
|
Source: HMSO, Coopey and Woodward
(1996)
Fixed investment into manufacturing dropped
by over 6% in 1971 and was forecast to drop further in 1972. The pessimistic
view was well founded as the decline in 1972 was eventually over 13 %. Despite
cutting purchase tax in 1971, activity in the economy was subdued, reflected by
the 5% Bank Rate in January 1972, its lowest since 1964.[17] Heath wanted British
Industry to be more competitive before it joined the EEC in January 1973.[18] Cabinet discussion over the
winter 1971/1972 focused on further monetary expansion with The Industry Act as
a further conduit for policy aimed at promoting growth. On 3 January, Heath
invited to dinner several bankers and industrialists including Jacob Rothschild,
Jim Slater (who had founded the conglomerate Slater Walker with the
Conservative minister Peter Walker) and Nigel Broackes who ran the construction
firm Trafalgar House. Nigel Broackes recalled the government “wanted to
encourage an investment boom with an abundance of easy credit.”[19]
The budget was set for 21
March 1972 and although the outcome has been called the “Barber Boom”, the architect
was Heath himself. The leader imposed his will on a resigned cabinet and disapproving
Treasury.[20]
Samuel Brittan acknowledged this in 1977 when he wrote that Barber was the
cabinet minister with the least responsibility for the “Barber Boom”.[21] Barber had skilfully
implemented Macleod’s tax reforms but was unable to match his predecessor’s
political agility in forming policy.
March 1972 Budget
Budget Year
|
Projected Change
in Tax
|
Party
|
||
April - April
|
£ Millions
|
|||
1960
|
71
|
Conservative
|
||
1961
|
58
|
Conservative
|
||
1962
|
9
|
Conservative
|
||
1963
|
-594
|
Conservative
|
||
1964
|
341
|
Con /
Labour
|
||
1965
|
223
|
Labour
|
||
1966
|
265
|
Labour
|
||
1967
|
-12
|
Labour
|
||
1968
|
923
|
Labour
|
||
1969
|
340
|
Labour
|
||
1970
|
-220
|
Conservative
|
||
1971
|
-671
|
Conservative
|
||
1972
|
-1809
|
Conservative
|
Source: The Banker April 1972
Barber targeted annual growth of 5% for 24
months, and deliberately mentioned the high growth rate because he wanted an
“announcement effect.” [22] The target was twice the
average rate of the previous decade and was to be achieved by increasing
consumer demand with unprecedented tax cuts of over £1,800m (£1,200m through
raising personal tax thresholds) and tax relief for loan- interest over £35 per
year. Notably industry was awarded tax concessions to increase employment by
allowing depreciation on all plant and machinery. William Keegan, writing the
lead article for the Financial Times, estimated that Barber’s measures aimed to
raise Government assistance to manufacturing investment by £115m in 1973-74 and
ultimately by £200m thereafter.[23] The editorial page called the budget a “Financial
Gamble” and quoted Barber: “The
high growth of output which I intend to sustain with this budget will entail a
growth of money supply that is also high by the standards of past years, in
order to ensure that adequate finance is available for the extra output.”[24]
Source: Bloomberg
Barber also
hinted at the intention to float Sterling, saying it was not “desirable to
distort domestic economies to an unacceptable extent in order to maintain
unrealistic exchange rates.”[25]
The Government was cognisant that an investment boom would possibly lead to a
balance of payments crisis, which would undermine the “dash for growth.” It had
been less than five years since Sterling’s forced devaluation against the
Dollar and cabinet thought that they could pre-empt a payments crisis by
floating Sterling and allowing any inflationary fears to be translated into a
weaker exchange rate. The Chancellor, emphasising the expansionary policy,
concluded his budget by saying that he had never agreed with those who had
advocated unemployment as a cure for inflation.
2
The Secondary Banking Sector and Changes in the
Money-markets.
In 1955
local authorities (councils) were required by Treasury to raise money in the
open market to supplement Government loans.[26]
Cash-rich industrial groups, attracted by the higher deposit rates, competed
with hire-purchase firms to lend money to the local authorities. A new
inter-bank market was created with secondary banks matching the requirements of
borrowers and depositors. The traditional banking sector, “the Clearers”, was
still restricted in its lending practices and missed out on this “whole-sale”
business. The controls imposed on the clearers were partly due to the numerous
sterling crises in the 1960s and they felt unfavourably treated. The other noticeable
difference between the clearers and the secondary banks was that deposits in
the wholesale market were not guaranteed.[27]
The clearers deposited their excess funds with discount houses, which had a
preferential position; they were ultimately guaranteed by the Bank of England. The
discount houses had the unique facility of being able to discount their assets
for cash with the central bank. In other words, the advantage of higher deposit
rates in the wholesale market was counterbalanced by the absence of a lender of
last resort.
New money markets (£ millions):
Local
Authority loans Inter-bank
deposits CDs
1971 1,974 2,200 2,372
1972 2,408 4,760 4,930
1973 3,368 7,694 5,983
Source: ECMC Monetary
Policy in the Countries EEC, supplement 1974
The election of a Conservative Government in
1970, keen to encourage competition and free-enterprise, allowed the Bank of
England the opportunity to modify the two-tier system of guaranteed and
unguaranteed deposits. British Banking had been extremely stable since the
Barings crisis in 1890 and consequently the danger of a potential crisis was
rarely discussed.[28]
The late 1960s monetary squeeze had slowed demand and balanced the external
deficit so the timing was propitious to institute expansionary change.
The Bank had
relied too heavily on credit control by quantitatively restricting lending by
clearing banks; the secondary banks had had the advantage of being subject to
less scrutiny. The Bank was pessimistic about the effectiveness of controls, in
particular loan ceilings, and also believed that they were inequitable and
undermined relations between the clearers and the Treasury department.[29]
The clearing banks had operated a cartel since 1914 which fixed deposit and
loan rates at levels closely aligned to the official Bank Rate, a method which
contrasted with the whole- sale money market. In the whole-sale market for
local authority funds, inter-bank deposits and CDs, deposit and lending rates
were determined competitively with less concern for the official Bank Rate. The
Bank of England wanted to reassert her monetary influence and narrow the divide.[30]
Competition and Credit Control
In May 1971 the Bank of England unveiled its
consultation document for “Competition and Credit Control” (C+CC). Quantitative
controls on lending and interest rate agreements between banks were abandoned.
There was to be greater reliance on the market for determining the interest
rate and all banks were to place 12.5% of their deposits as “Special Deposits”
in the form of Treasury bills, short duration bonds or cash at the Bank of
England. The Bank reserved the right to call on the Special Deposits of all the banks and would abandon its
previous policy of supporting a weak Gilt market. Lord O’Brien, the Governor of
the Bank, emphasised the new ethos: “the allocation of credit is primarily
determined by cost.”[31] The Economist praised the proposal (“Yes, at
last, a Revolution for the City”) but concluded that the Bank had essentially
admitted to the part played by poor monetary policy in a “disastrous decade for
British Economic History.”[32]
The
Treasury was more circumspect in its praise. Abandoning loan ceilings caused
them concern, because they viewed such controls as the primary means of squeezing credit. Also, the clearers had used a
28% liquidity ratio (although that included notes and coins), rather than the
12.5%, and it was concluded that interest rates would have to rise to
unprecedented levels in the case of a credit boom. In particular, the Treasury
feared that Industry would suffer unusually high rates when their traditional
lenders, the clearers, were not bound by the agreed cartel rate.[33]
In fact Treasury’s prescient assessment of the future Bank Rate in a credit
boom was ironically understated because the 5% Bank Rate at the time
was so low, that a move above the politically sensitive 10%
rate appeared inconceivable. If the Bank Rate had been higher at the time, C+CC
might not have received full Government assent.
One later
change is worthy of note. In September 1972 the Bank Rate was replaced by the
Minimum Lending Rate (MLR) which was determined by the Treasury Bill Rate. This was to reinforce the new thinking; a market
determined cost of money that could immediately adapt to prevailing conditions.
3
The Property Market 1955-1970.
Property Data
The sources and data for commercial
property up to 1971 draws on the work of Peter Scott who aggregated prices from
estate agents, trade magazines, newspapers and
the Royal Institutes of Chartered Surveyors (RICS). From 1971 national
data from the Investment Property Databank (IPD) and London data from CB Hillier Parker are
used, both widely accepted by the industry. The coverage and transparency of
current market indices cannot be matched before 1980 and even indices in the
1980s are based on very small samples. Data from the 1970s cannot be cross -
referenced or considered independent. In particular, valuations changed as rent
reviews became more frequent which undermined the consistency of prices and
indices. This will be discussed further in the next section. The Nationwide
Index is used for residential property, which is both comprehensive and consistent,
but it should be noted that data were sourced from property purchased with a
mortgage which ignored the relatively few debt- free property purchases.
Source: Scott
(1996)
Commercial Property
Up until 1955
investment into Commercial Property was considered a low risk fixed income
investment (bond) because the rent was fixed under long leases from 99 to 999
years. Inflation and institutional demand for an equity type (property) asset
changed the market to one where upward only
rent reviews were incorporated into leases.[34]
Rent reviews became more frequent
falling through steps of 50, 40, 33, 21, 14 and 7 years until the 1970s when 5
years became the standard. Scott (1996) found strong statistical
evidence that institutional investment increased with more frequent rent
reviews.
Source: Scott
(1996) and IPD
More
frequent rent reviews also played a large part in increasing perceived property
values in the early 1970s. The British method of valuing property was
simplistic; divide the rent by the accepted market yield. Therefore if the rent
was £200.000 and accepted yield 5%, the property was valued at £4.000.000. An
upward rent review immediately increased its market value. As property itself
was the basis of collateral, a rent review would give the landlord more bargaining
power when negotiating larger loans.
The market
to invest in commercial property was expanded by the Insurance Companies with (Unauthorised)
Property Unit Trusts, which allowed charities and pension funds the ability to
invest without having to manage the premises themselves. They were unauthorised
for sale to the public but the market was enlarged for the retail sector by the
introduction of single premium life policies. These life assurance policies
paid bonuses in excess of the life cover commensurate with the performance of a
successful property portfolio. Jonathan
Harris was repeatedly advised that the most efficient way for a large surveying
practice to start a property company was to create an insurance company or
consider a joint venture.[35]
Development of newly built commercial property
in the early 1960s was invigorated by business switching to the use of computers,
which required larger floor- space and load-bearing structure than traditional office
buildings. [36] A computer
required an office with eight meter ceilings, open floor space of 250 square
meters and the ability to withstand the considerable weight of a mainframe. Traditional
office space was ill- equipped for the technological advance and corporations
needed to build property of unusually large dimensions.
In November 1964 the Labour Government ostensibly
prohibited property development in Greater London. Their intention was to encourage
business to relocate out of London in an attempt to decentralise the economy
and revitalise towns with older property stock.[37]
They were also concerned by traffic congestion in the Capital. The Labour Government
required that developers have both planning permission and a special permit
from the Board of Trade. They also abolished the practice of awarding
compensation of £10 per square foot when a legitimate
proposal for planning permission was turned down.
Following the
supply constriction, The Finance Act 1965 introduced Corporation Tax (40%
rising to 45% in 1969) which made direct
investment into property more attractive than investment into property companies
because the latter resulted in a double taxation for corporate investors. Consequently
property companies traded at a discount to their net asset value which often
led to hostile takeovers of the weaker, under-capitalised ones.[38] Developers had their position undermined
further in 1967 with the introduction of the Land Commission which bought land
for “essential purposes” and imposed a “betterment levy” of 40% when the land
was sold or leased. As a consequence of these three factors, the rate of
institutional direct investment in
property investment rose from an (annualised) average 5.6 % in the period
1948-1964 to 17.8% between 1964 and1973. In a 1971 conference hosted by the
Financial Times and Investors Chronicle, it was estimated that between 1966 and
1970 empty office space in the City of London declined from 3 to 0.5 million
square feet. Rents had increased by between 200 and 300% due to the tight supply,
compounding the inflationary effect, which made property investment appear even
more attractive.[39]
The
intention of the Finance Act which imposed Corporation Tax at the point of distribution
of dividends to investors was to encourage manufacturing firms to reinvest
profits, but this had an unforeseen consequence for the property sector. Property
companies now favoured dealing, which
was subject to 30% capital gains tax, over longer-term investment because the
latter would create (distributive) rental income that incurred a higher tax
liability of 40-45%. Property companies who had surplus rental income were now
incentivised to take out more debt and use the surplus to pay tax-deductible
interest charges. The optimum strategy was to be highly geared, service debt
and retain profits to speculatively buy more property with little intention of
investment. The corollary was that the companies that were taken over had many
of their assets stripped and sold for immediate profit.[40]
In 1970, following the Conservative
election, Peter Walker, the Secretary for the Environment, relaxed controls on
office development and abolished the Land Commission and its system of
betterment levies. This was motivated by attempting to dampen the rental market
and it was also the Government’s view that Britain’s entry into the EEC would
increase demand for space.[41]
The South East planning region had permitted just over 9 ¼ million square feet
of development in the 3 years 1966-69, and following Walker’s decision, over 26
¼ million square feet were developed by the end of 1973.In the 1971 budget, Corporation Tax was reduced by 5% which immediately increased corporate
retained- earnings. In 1971, the FT Actuaries Property Share Index was the best
performing stock-market sector with an annual rise of 61%.[42]
Residential Property
Source: Nationwide
Residential Index (property-base year 1960)
OECD (inflation)
The 1965 Rent Act introduced controls called “fair rents” that were
intended to regenerate the private, residential rental market.[43]
One estimate in 1968 by Allsop suggested that central London rents were 8-10%
below open market value and it was often concluded that the Act galvanised
property companies to leave the residential sector.[44]
However, the imposition of Corporation Tax also contributed because the tax
incentive to deal rather than hold favoured commercial property, because there were
more opportunities to trade in large commercial projects than commensurately
large blocks of residential flats. Consequently, any large scale transactions
in residential property usually involved the break-up of the blocks of flats for
immediate sale because holding rent-controlled property had a (corporation) tax
cost and implicit loss due to the inability to increase rents. Fear of higher
future inflation would make the rent-controlled residential sector even less appealing.
On the
demand side, there was a growing number of entrepreneurs willing to buy
residential property because it was sold at a discount to NAV with the
secondary banks able to provide credit with minimal central bank regulation. The
specialist companies had “trading status” which allowed them to sell property subject
to the lower Capital Gains Tax rate. The companies were often partly or even
wholly owned by the secondary banks which financed the project.[45]
In 1968 the conglomerate Slater Walker bought Drages from Great Universal
Stores specifically because Drages owned 50% of a fully authorized bank, Ralli
Brothers (Bankers) Ltd.[46]
After acquiring full control of Ralli,
the bank was utilised to finance almost all the conglomerate’s projects,
notably property.[47]
Slater Walker moved into investment services, attracted depositors and created
pension funds partly to self- finance take- overs and property acquisitions in
the dual role of banker and trader.
Property had changed from a low-turnover
investment market in the early 1960s to an aggressive dealers market when the
Conservatives took office. There were 3 distinct groups: Corporate Landlords
including pension funds, who were selling the residential part of their
portfolios, new trading companies that only dealt and enjoyed lower taxation
(30% rather than 45%) and speculative traders who specialized in break-ups. Office
space was in short supply particularly in the City and the secondary banks had
access to the wholesale money markets to finance property.
4
Property, Inflation and the
Political Economy: 1970-1973
Shocks to the Property Market
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) demonstrated that
even small temporary shocks to income distribution could generate large
fluctuations in asset prices and output.[48] In their model economy,
debtors were free from recourse unless their collateral was secured, and credit
limits (and their abandonment) interacted strongly with asset prices. The early
1970s property market was financed by secured loans; secured on the property or
land itself. To review, there were two income distribution shocks before the
Heath Government which had the potential to greatly affect property prices; the
introduction of upward only rent reviews (1955-1970) and changes in corporate
taxation policy (1965).
Equally,
between 1955 and Heath’s Government there were three other distinct developments that supported the building and
valuation of commercial property; a newly-created wholesale interbank
money-market (1955-1972), the incorporation of the computer which
necessitated new (larger) office space
(1961) and finally the Labour party’s effective ban on development in London
and the South East (1964). The reversal of the development ban in 1970
immediately incentivised new investors into a meagrely supplied market. The
Economist reflected that the Government had chosen to relax planning procedures
because it was a reflationary policy easy to achieve.[49]
After the election, a sixth policy change,
the Introduction of C+CC by the Bank of England (1971), allowed the Clearing
Banks to compete with the secondary Banks to allocate credit. This change
particularly supported residential property because the clearing banks offered
personal mortgages which were no longer subject to quantitative controls. The
seventh policy (and income distribution shock) was the volte face by the
Conservative Party.
Having cut spending in 1970 and
1971, the dash for growth in 1972 incentivised individuals to borrow more for
house purchase because there was now income tax relief on all mortgage-interest.
Equally, fears of unemployment lessened
after the 1972 budget. The perceived risk of buying property with a mortgage repaid
from earnings diminished as unemployment fell from 3.1% in 1972 to 2.1% at the
end of 1973. Monthly Gallup polls asked the question “What do you think is the
most serious problem facing the country?” In 1971 an average of 27% answered
“Unemployment” but that figured dropped to fewer than 4% in 1973 and 1974.[50]
% increase p.a. 1970 1971 1972 1973
GDP (real) 2.2 1.6 3.4
5.6
M3 8.6 14.0
27.2 27.1
Source: Economic Trends Supplement (1990)
Two further
shocks will be discussed in greater detail. One was the psychological effect of
the macroeconomic environment on property buyers, particularly in respect to
price-inflation and wage –inflation. The second was the effect of the changing political
economy which had prioritised growth and employment without a fully independent
central bank to counter inflationary pressures.
Inflation
Source: RPI - Office for National Statistics, Wages - OECD
The quiet employment market of the
1960s was replaced by tougher wage bargaining at the start of the Conservative
term. The “Philips curve” relationship, correlating increased unemployment with
lower wage increases started breaking down in the early 1970s.[51] Strike activity increased as
Trade Union members hardened their resolve to negotiate for higher wages in response to higher inflation. Their
attitude was not based on current conditions but expectation because it wasn’t
until 1975 that RPI actually exceeded annual wages. In other words, an
important source of inflation was the wage-price spiral that created a self-
fulfilling upward momentum. In addition to the endogenous wage-price spiral,
exogenous events like the breakdown of Bretton Woods and Gold convertibility
had precipitated a boom in commodities. Barber floated Sterling in June 1972
and despite its subsequent weakness the balance of payments worsened from a
positive £1,123 m in 1971 to negative £1,100 m in 1973 which reflected the overheating
economy.
Source: Office for National Statistics; Economic Trends Annual
Supplement 2006
The intention of the 1972 budget was
to increase investment into manufacturing and create industrial employment;
however the Confederation of British Industry’s survey following the budget
reported that only 9% of firms planned to increase spending on plant and
machinery over the next twelve months.[52] In fact investment fell 13%
in 1972 and the 1973 inflation-adjusted level was over 9% less than in 1970.
The strong property market had diverted investment away from manufacturing and
Heath blamed the Bank of England’s liberalisation of credit controls for the
distorted economy.[53]
The fall in unemployment to 500,000 after the
“dash for growth” was not due to an increase in industrial employment but the creation
of 400,000 new public sector jobs between 1971 and 1974, an explicit
contradiction of the original ethos of disengagement. Heath’s assignation of
blame to the Bank of England and C+CC neglected the part played by Government
economic policy, particularly in worsening the inflationary environment. Calomiris
(2009) emphasised the point that improving the financial system “depends on the
political environment.” [54] Brendan Sewill, Barber’s
special assistant, wrote to minsters saying the property boom was “the froth on
the top of a pint of beer, undesirable…but perhaps inevitable” but this
transpired to be a naive assessment.[55]
Inflation and Property
New money markets (£ millions):
Local Authority Loans Inter-bank deposits CDs
1971 1,974 2,200 2,372
1972 2,408 4,760 4,930
1973 3,368 7,694 5,983
Source:
ECMC Monetary Policy in the Countries EEC,
supplement 1974
Evidence
of inflation’s effect on investment flows into property was linked to credit
creation and during 1972-1973 the combination was consistently cited by the
larger property investors as the reason
to buy property; it was considered the best hedge against higher prices and
easy to transact in a credit boom. Mike Slade, CEO of Helical Bar, remembered
that the secondary banks tried to lend money at “even more alarmingly
competitive levels” and Ronald Lyon, whose Lyon Group collapsed in 1974 with
£3m capital supporting £93m loans, recalled the effect inflation had on lenders:
“it is no exaggeration to say that we were having bank money thrust at us from
all directions.” [56]
The management of Centre Point on
Oxford Street was a more concrete example of the distorting effects of
inflation. The skyscraper was deliberately left unoccupied for years by demanding
unrealistically high rent. The logic was that a strong trend in rising rents
(which reflected inflation) would implicitly revalue the building higher the
longer it was left unoccupied. In other words, loss of rent for a given period would
be more than made up by increased value and higher expected rent in the future.[57]
Britain was facing its highest
inflation rate since the First World War and there was a lack of confidence in
fiat currency. The banks considered property the least risky asset in an
inflationary environment.[58] Their view was mirrored by
insurance companies and pension funds who needed to invest large cash inflows
as inflation increased policy premiums and pension contributions.
Jim Slater’s expansion into property “was very
much stimulated by the availability of easy credit.”[59] Walker had relaxed development controls when empty
office space in London was only 20% of the 1966 level and Slater’s decision to
move into banking to finance property created a niche for the conglomerate. He
observed that primary merchant banks and clearers rarely took direct stakes in
property development.[60] This was symptomatic of the
embedded nature of British Banking which eschewed the co-investment between
finance and industry favoured by Germany and other continental countries. Banks and large investors had tended to avoid
corporate management preferring liquidity and the ability to sell stock (in a
secondary market) rather than deal with the consequences of direct (illiquid)
primary investment, particularly during a crisis.[61] They also feared exposure to a mismatched
balance sheet of equity and debt. The banks, unused to direct investment, were forced
to increase lending and their focus on the property sector reflected the view
that land was sound collateral in an inflationary environment.
Source: OECD
The banks’ move into property
lending had three direct consequences that would undermine the government’s
policy to increase industrial investment. Firstly, it created a paucity of
credit for industry that prompted a letter from The Governor of the Bank of
England to the banks specifically asking “for further restraint on lending for
property development and financial transactions.”[62] The Bank of England was
particularly concerned that industry would be unable to increase exports in the
face of a deteriorating trade balance. Secondly, short term speculation pushed
up property values that dissuaded industry from expansion that required new premises
and thirdly, property development increased more quickly than industry’s need
for the new supply, distorting the economy with an allocation of unused
resources. Veblen (1904) observed that credit for property, which has no
industrial use, may be “coined into means of payment” but the property
“represents, in the aggregate, only fictitious industrial equipment.”[63] In other words, the
speculative property market would not further an increase in British
manufacturing productivity favoured by the Bank of England.
Aside from these reasons, there was a
pervasive attitude in Britain that property was an essential part of investment
policy. Following the 1972 budget, the editorial of Estate’s Gazette concluded:
“Mr Barber’s work can only realise its potential if Mr Walker’s department can
be persuaded to adopt a more positive attitude towards the release of land for
development.”[64]
The Political Economy and Inflation
|
1972
|
1973
|
1974
|
||
|
|
|
|
|
|
Food
|
125
|
179
|
246
|
||
Industrial Materials
|
113
|
178
|
195
|
||
Fibres
|
136
|
238
|
216
|
||
Metals
|
98
|
141
|
181
|
||
All Items
|
121
|
178
|
226
|
Source: OECD, Coopey
and Woodward Commodity Price Indices
1971=100
In November 1972, the Heath Government
was forced into another U-turn: incomes policy. The miners had won a 20% wage
increase in strict contradiction of the N-1 policy which advocated a wage
increase had to be less than the previous settlement. The new directive was
implemented in three stages and the 3rd stage particularly distorted
prices by indexing wages to consumer prices, over and above a 7 % hurdle. The indexation
was partly based on import prices which rose rapidly during the post -1971
commodity booms and consequently threshold payments were regularly triggered. [65]A combination of the new
incomes policy, costly imports due to Sterling weakness and policy aimed at
stimulating demand exaggerated asset price inflation because it built up
expectations of future price increases. It would become harder to deal with
shocks without creating excessive inflation if monetary policy were eased or
higher unemployment if either monetary or fiscal policy were tightened. Hartley
(1977) described the Heath incomes policy without a concomitant decrease in aggregate
demand as an example of “King Canute Economics”; it was simply unequal to the
task of restraining militant Trade Unions in an over- heating economy.
Gallup Opinion Polls, questioning the public
on the most serious problem facing the country, also suggested an over-heating
economy. In 1971 27 % of the population thought inflation was the most pressing
concern but this had risen to 54 % by 1974.[66]
|
|
Advances
|
|
Nominal Property
|
£ Billions
|
£ Thousands
|
|||
Q4 71
|
£8,526
|
£5,533
|
||
Q1 72
|
£9,594
|
£6,008
|
||
Q2 72
|
£12,394
|
£6,557
|
||
Q3 72
|
£13,486
|
£7,395
|
||
Q4 72
|
£14,479
|
£7,880
|
||
Q1 73
|
£16,119
|
£8,396
|
||
Q2 73
|
£16,804
|
£8,832
|
||
Q3 73
|
£18,648
|
£9,183
|
||
Q4 73
|
£20,057
|
£9,767
|
||
Q1 74
|
£21,130
|
£9,928
|
||
Q2 74
|
£21,602
|
£10,027
|
||
Q3 74
|
£22,863
|
£10,148
|
||
Q4 74
|
£23,082
|
£10,208
|
||
Q1 75
|
£23,362
|
£10,388
|
Source: BEQB March
1972-June 1975, Nationwide Property Index
The rush into
residential property during the boom was reflected by the extent of domestic UK
bank lending. Between January 1972 and January 1974 advances to UK residents
climbed 135% to over £23 billion with a commensurate 76% rise in the Nationwide
Housing Index over the same period.[67]
The Political Economy
Intervention
In March 1973 upward market pressure on
interest rates influenced the Government to intervene in the mortgage market.
The building societies required a 10% mortgage rate but the Government felt
that its incomes policy was sufficiently punitive to dampen consumer spending.
10% was an emotive headline number which garnered popular criticism as the
1,000,000 unemployment figure had the previous year. The cabinet awarded grants
to the building societies to cap the mortgage rate at 9.5%, a policy that was
fiercely opposed by Barber, who wanted a much tighter monetary policy.[68] The Bank of England had
intended that the quid pro quo for credit expansion in an overheating economy
would be higher rates and although the Bank was sympathetic to Barber, did not
have the authority to prevent the directive. Lord O’Brien, while expressing
admiration for Heath’s integrity, later wrote “He was not easily deflected from
what he felt he wanted to do.” [69]
Cross- country analysis has suggested that
excess monetary growth was indicative of a central bank with limited authority
and M3 growth in Britain was over 27% in both 1973 and 1974.[70] The Bank had enjoyed considerable
freedom, but once Sterling floated its influence on monetary policy waned and
Heath’s ministers began to question the Bank’s methods and techniques.[71] The governor made clear in his annual speech
to bankers in late 1972 that monetary policy was too loose and the property
market had become speculative: “The state of the property and housing market
has become unruly with prices moving wildly ahead; unnecessarily far to provide
an incentive for new building.”[72]
Historical Examples of Property
Speculation and Bank Crises
Calomiris (2009) noted the correlation
between property speculation and bank crises. The four countries before World
War One with the worst episodes of bank failures, Argentina, Australia, Italy
and Norway had two things in common; their Governments had all granted
subsidies to real estate risk takers and all
four countries had property booms that
burst resulting in large losses to the financial system.[73] The Australian boom and bust
between 1885 and 1893 was stimulated by Government “land-banks” which lent
money on the security of the land. The banks also invested on their own account
and the 1864 Victoria Companies Act allowed speculators and banks to exploit
accounting loopholes in an unethical manner. Many were associated with fraud at
the top of the boom.[74]
The British speculative boom continued in
early 1973, despite rising interest rates, for two reasons. Rather than tightening
credit, lenders made the assumption that a liquidation of higher valued
property would recoup the interest charges. Their optimism was supported by the
questionable valuations assigned by surveyors, particularly at the initial
stages of development, and auditors who rarely questioned the (optimistic)
estimated completion dates and projected rents. The debt interest often
exceeded rental income and unethical accounting made the negative funding more
dangerous as entrepreneurs added interest to the cost of their development,
when it should have been deducted from profit.[75] It must be remembered that the secondary banks
often had equity stakes in property companies and were reluctant to curtail
business. They also had increased operations outside London; office space
increased by 25 and 33% in Bristol and Leeds respectively between 1970 and
1975. [76]
The second reason for
continued speculation was found in the political economy. Development was
widely expected to be constrained by the Government in early 1973. Office space
deliberately left unoccupied and low development (capital gains) taxes were creating
public disquiet and central bank disapproval. The Government ignored change and
even helped the residential sector when they capped the building society
mortgage rate. The Economist teased Barber using the imagery of a poodle that did
not bite.[77]
London commercial property prices rose by
over 25% in the first half of 1973 and in July Heath gave a press conference to
financial journalists. Asked whether it was time to restrict credit to help the
deteriorating balance of payments, Heath said no.
The End of the Bull Market
Source: BEQB April 1973-June 1974
Three distinct policy changes in
response to further deterioration in the balance of payments and excessive Government
spending finally halted the property market in late 1973; higher interest
rates, fiscal tightening and a re-imposition of bank-lending controls. The
money market forced a historically large interest rate rise of 4% in July (MLR
11.5 %) which effectively set property borrowing costs at 14% or higher. The
trade gap worsened in November and the MLR was raised to 13%. More ominously
the secondary banks now experienced wider credit spreads as the margin they had
to pay over the inter-bank rate widened from around 50 basis points to 100-200
basis points as rumours circulated about the solvency of certain secondary
banks, in particular London and County.[78] Consequently there were
widespread withdrawals of deposits from the money markets which the secondary
banks relied on for liquidity and in some cases the banks lost all access to
the credit markets and faced collapse.[79] The second policy change,
implemented by Barber in an emergency budget (December 1973), increased the top
tier of personal tax by 10 % reversing the stated intention of abolition. Finally
a “corset” was imposed on banks which penalised them for borrowing in the
wholesale market above a prescribed low threshold.
Source: Hillier Parker City of
London Property Index (base Q3 1972)
Many developers were caught
by the severe rise in interest rates before project completion. Their plan had
been to borrow short- term during development and subsequently secure longer-
term finance after completion, when tenants took five year (or longer) leases. However many had underestimated the upward
pressure on rates and had chosen to wait before securing the longer term
finance.
The record MLR and restricted
access to credit markets meant that borrowing costs varied from 16-20+%. In
December the Bank of England was faced with the insolvency of London and County
and Cedar Holdings, the first of the secondary banks requiring help. At the
same time the Government’s credibility diminished with the miner’s strike in
late 1973-1974 and failure of negotiations to halt industrial action. OPEC 1
had forced oil prices higher following the Yom Kippur war (October 1973) and expensive
oil combined with the coal shortage meant industry was forced into working a 3
day week. In early February 1974 Heath
called a snap election asking “Who
governs Britain?” and was defeated by Harold Wilson leading the Labour Party.
5
The Secondary Banking Crisis: 1973
– 1977
The secondary banking crisis unfolded between late 1973 and mid 1977 in three
distinct stages; lack of liquidity between November 1973 and March 1974,
potential insolvency as the property market collapsed into December 1974 and a
final phase when the Bank directly intervened and then forcibly took over
several institutions . However in early 1973 the Scottish Co-operative
Wholesale Society (SCOOP) got into difficulty, a case which exemplified the
problems facing the sector and even as
late as 1977 Johnson Matthey and Slater
Walker created complications for the Bank and the Labour Chancellor Denis
Healey.[80]
SCOOP had a portfolio of £90 million of Certificates
of Deposits (CDs) with commitments to buy £365 million more, which was financed
in the inter-bank market at a higher interest rate than the average yield of
the CDs. The negative cash flow between low yielding CDs and higher borrowings necessitated
financial assistance to avoid insolvency. The Bank of England formed a
syndicate with the clearers to support SCOOP but the Bank’s small stake (5 %)
created resentment among the other members because of the inevitable losses.[81]
Source: BEQB April 1973-
September 1974
Accurate matching of assets and liabilities
was the central requirement to keep secondary banks solvent in a crisis.
Clearing banks depended on sufficient cash (and near-cash) assets to meet depositors
withdrawing their money and in extremis could rely on the central bank as
lender of last resort. The secondary banks accessed the wholesale market for
deposits and correspondingly lent large amounts to property companies and other
financial institutions rather than holding (lower yielding) Government bonds.
Matching assets and liabilities was central to their solvency; that is to say,
the aggregate amount of loans and deposits within a given lending period had to
be relatively similar. If adequate liquidity was pivotal for the clearing banks,
adroit matching was central to the secondary banks.[82]
In order to create profit, the secondary banks
might borrow short term and lend longer term in the more usual situation that
the rate of interest increases the longer the duration of the loan.[83] A certain mismatching using
a positive yield curve was the accepted way to be profitable. However, in late
1973 when interest rates rose sharply, the secondary banks found they had to
borrow at increasingly higher rates and their cash flow turned negative as short
term rates often exceeded longer term rates. Figures from the Bank of England’s
quarterly bulletin show that at the end of April 1973 40 % of the secondary
banks’ borrowings were short term and due to be refinanced within 90 days.[84] The 4% rise in the MLR in
July would have greatly harmed cash-flow. The secondary banks with the most
mismatched loan books were under the greatest pressure and highly vulnerable to
financial contagion because many of their deposits were from other financial
institutions. Even premier institutions’ share prices collapsed in a developing
situation described by the Governor of the Bank of England as a “contagion of
fear.”[85]
Source: Bloomberg
The secondary banks faced
two major difficulties from late 1973. Industrial companies were able to
continue in the 1973/1974 recession because even if plant and machinery were depreciating
in value, they still appeared on the balance sheet at cost less depreciation. In
contrast, the assets of the secondary banks included equities and quoted loan
stock which had to be valued at the market price; between 1973 and 1974 the Financial
Times Stock Exchange Index fell 68%. Furthermore, many of their loans to
property companies were made on 33% (land) collateral and consequently in a
period when many land values halved, the property companies whom they lent to
were already insolvent. This would force the secondary banks to discount their
loan books.
It should be remembered that since C+CC
secondary banks had had to compete with established banks that were preferred
by the more financially secure counterparts. The secondary sector had riskier,
less well matched loan portfolios and large concentrated equity stakes as a consequence
of their need to secure business. Lack of banking experience in volatile
markets added to their vulnerability.
Solution
The
initial solution to the crisis was to ensure immediate adequate liquidity for
the secondary banks, whose depositors were not guaranteed by a lender of last
resort. The inability of London and County and Cedar Holdings to borrow funds
had prompted crisis meetings and The Bank of England coerced the clearers and
larger pension funds to contribute to a support fund of £1 billion (“The Lifeboat”)
on the evening of 19 December 1973, stating that the meeting would not end
until a solution had been found. [86] The Bank deemed it necessary to have a
credible plan before the stock market opened the following day and demanded
full cooperation from the clearers. The Economist on 5 January 1974 (“How the
City was saved”) made it clear that many “arms had to be twisted in Camelot”
even though “the City of London was on the brink of a terrifying collapse”[87] Aware of earlier criticism
during the bailout of SCOOP, the Bank contributed 10% to Lifeboat.
In
May 1974, the crisis entered the second stage with the collapse of William
Stern’s £250 million property empire, financed with an unusually high debt to total-assets
ratio of 80 %, with interest costs three times the group’s income. The £200
million of bad debt that emanated from Stern made the initial support fund of
£1 billion appear inadequate to support the secondary banks, and by July the
Lifeboat had already advanced £675 million. Internal correspondence within the
Bank of England about a necessary increase to Lifeboat of between £.5 billion
and £1 billion contrasted with the anxiety of the clearers who felt that their
own depositors, fearing contagion, might withdraw funds as it became clear how dangerous
the clearer’s balance sheets had become.[88] The average capital and
declared reserves of the clearers was 6 % of total liabilities, less than half
the 12.5 % demanded by C+CC. A compromise fund limit of £1.2 billion was agreed
and the Bank deemed it necessary for direct
intervention into the property market, which was in danger of falling too
rapidly.
Having enforced
cooperation between the clearers and pension funds to add liquidity at the
beginning of the crisis, the Bank now persuaded creditors to abstain from
demanding whole sale liquidation of property stock when property companies
collapsed. For example, under the chair of Sir Kenneth Cork, fifty creditors of
Stern agreed not to call in receivers, nor to impose penal interest charges
(which they were entitled to) and all promised
property should be slowly sold
“off-market” to prevent attention and negative publicity.[89] The “Cork Dam” was
supplemented with cooperation by the pension funds and insurance companies who
bought large blocks of distressed property to support the market. The larger
institutions had retained their faith in property being a good investment
during an inflationary period to meet increased liabilities but their
commitment to supporting the market was still surprising. There was a necessary
collegiate spirit to protect jobs and the City’s reputation, but Plender (1982)
suggested the allegiance may have stemmed from the fear of more punitive
regulation from a newly elected Labour party.[90] However, as Veblen (1904) predicted, it
certainly constituted a transfer of assets from debtors to creditors.
The third stage of the crisis,
when the Bank made direct bailouts,
was made inevitable by the depletion of Lifeboat’s funds and the need for
discretion to allay public alarm. Although the Bank would be forced to take
over and wind down Slater Walker in late 1977, files in the Bank’s archives
clearly demonstrate an early example of secret support. On 31 December 1974 the
Bank advanced Slater Walker £10 million of unsecured cash following a meeting
10 days earlier between Slater and the Governor,
Gordon Richardson. In response to a letter on the 6 February 1975 by the
financial director of Slater Walker, asking for written confirmation of the
loan, D. Somerset, deputy chief cashier to the Bank of England, replied “I
should perhaps explain that the advance of £10 million…was treated here as
strictly confidential and, as a consequence, the staff dealing with your
request were not aware that it had been made.”[91] The Bank’s concern with
Slater Walker increased during 1975 and after Slater’s resignation and a full
audit by accountants Peat Marwick and Mitchell and Price Waterhouse, the extent
and complexities of the conglomerate’s borrowings necessitated a Bank of
England bail out of £40 million to protect the group’s depositors. When Richardson
briefed the new Chancellor, Denis Healey, it was agreed that knowledge of the
bailout should be kept “to a select few”.[92]
Three Largest Secondary Banks by Gross Assets
|
|||||
1971
|
1971
|
1973
|
1975
|
Peak-
|
|
trough %
|
|||||
Gross Assets
|
Pre-tax
|
Pre-tax
|
Pre-tax
|
share price
|
|
£ millions
|
profit
|
profit
|
profit
|
change
|
|
Slater Walker
Securities
|
280
|
16
|
23
|
-40
|
-89
|
FNFC*
|
182
|
8
|
18
|
-83
|
-92
|
United Dominions Trust
|
466
|
11
|
24
|
-54
|
-98
|
*First National Finance Corporation
|
Source:
Reid (1982)
Eight of the twenty six
companies that received Lifeboat support eventually went into liquidation,
eleven were taken over but four banks did manage to regain profitability and survive.
Richardson was widely praised for Lifeboat and the handling of the crisis, particularly
as the necessary cooperation between clearers, pension funds and insurance
companies had been achieved by his ability to negotiate terms that were not in
everyone’s interest. [93] By organising the private,
off-market sale of property stock from specialist companies to pension funds
and insurance companies, an avalanche of sales and adverse publicity were avoided.
The transaction prices were artificially high but the wider interests of the
financial system had been satisfied. The solvency levels of the insurance
companies had fallen to 25% in 1974 (the accepted minimum level was 40%) and
because property was being transacted at support- price levels, institutions
were able to mark the rest of their property portfolio at commensurately higher
valuations.[94]
Richardson had possibly used this as a bargaining tool to allay the insurance
companies’ fears of even lower and more dangerous solvency levels.
6
The Property Market 1974-1976
Commercial Property
Source: Hillier Parker London
Property index
The rise in the value of collateral
(land) influenced the expansion of credit during the boom, but when land prices
fell and loans had to be written down, credit quickly diminished and the
property companies found themselves isolated. The bailout of London and County
and Cedar Holdings was a tipping point that marked large, sometimes enforced,
liquidation of property. Lifeboat only advanced capital to the secondary banks,
not to property companies themselves. Pension funds had mistakenly entered the
market with the attitude that buildings decayed, but land did not and upward
only (ground) rent reviews would lend support to land prices. If the Pension
funds and Insurance Companies had not kept participating in the 1974 / 75 bear
market (with Bank of England encouragement) the self-fulfilling cycle down of lower land
values leading to even less credit might have been more dangerous. It should
therefore be seen that the crash was a banking and property company crisis
rather than a crisis in land investment with pension funds and insurance
companies buying distressed property from property companies and secondary
banks.
Net Investment in Property (£
million)
1970
1974 1975
1976 1977
Insurance Cos and 294 710 748 962
944
Pension Funds
Capital Market and 47
(2) 106
90
54
Property Unit Trusts
Banks 16 979
98
(58)
(166)
Total 357
1.687 1.052 994 832
Source: Financial Statistics
HMSO.
By March 1974 property
auctions were being cancelled and the few property deals being transacted were
done privately at large discounts to 1973 valuations. Deposit rates of over 15%
were too attractive in comparison to investing in property and the newly
elected Labour Party was not considered sympathetic to the sector. Michael
Peachey of Hammerson, the builder of Brent Cross, Europe’s largest shopping
Centre, recalled “we didn’t panic at Hammerson, but we certainly had to start
selling.” In August 1974 the environment darkened. The Bank of England demanded
more disclosure from the secondary banks and commercial Estate Agents Jones,
Lang and LaSalle held a crisis director’s conference and the minutes state
“there remains very little evidence of completed transactions at any level.” [95] Property companies rapidly
contracted in size and even after the late 1970s recovery, their assets of £7
billion in 1980 were a third less than in 1970 despite a decennial inflation
rate of over 13% compounded.[96]
During 1974 financial companies struggled as
the stock market fell to its nadir in December when the Bank of England had to
quash rumours that National Westminster Bank was insolvent. The declining stock
market added pressure to the assets of the secondary banks, restricting their
ability to lend and at the same time the clearers had most of their reserves
placed in Lifeboat. By the end of 1974 Lifeboat had only £18 million with the
Bank
facing the likelihood of requiring
its reserves to support the failing secondary sector. After a 1.7% fall in GDP
in 1974 neither the clearers nor secondary banks had sufficient capital to
consider industrial investment, however five large insurance companies
collaborated and bought the oversold stock market in early 1975. This was
widely believed to be with Bank of England encouragement and it helped many vulnerable
balance sheets as the market rose dramatically 50% in January alone.[97]
Residential Property
Source: Nationwide and OECD
The newly
elected Labour party in February 1974 lost control of incomes policy and the
miners’ victory heralded unparalleled wage inflation of over 26% in 1974. The
Residential sector rose 15% (nominally) in 1974-75 but fell over 25% in real
terms. The market mechanism for unwinding excess speculation came from higher
wages (26.4%, 16.8%) which returned UK average house prices to the longer term
average of 2.8 times average-income. Individuals tended to
have only one property and did not have the complex, over-leveraged balance
sheets of the secondary banks and property companies. The clearers and building
societies rarely lent more than three times income and consequently even late
buyers in the boom remained solvent as higher wages allowed overstretched
borrowers to maintain interest payments. If the Labour party had managed a
tight fiscal policy in the mid-1970s, with the same success as they had following
the 1967 devaluation, and controlled wage inflation, the residential market (and
clearers) may well have been under considerable pressure. This counterfactual
would be an interesting topic for further research.
Property Unit Trusts
Property unit trusts were the other
long-term losers in the crisis with the secondary banks and property companies.
In 1973 property unit trusts accounted for 8.6% of all institutional investment
into property but fell to 5.1% by 1980 due to forced selling when redemption
requests increased. Furthermore, during the bear market surveyors had been slow
to lower valuations, because they required evidence of comparable transaction
prices, and consequently unit trust valuations were often too high.[98] This had enticed unit holders to immediately
sell their holdings and in a low-volume, falling market only the best property
could be sold with the remainder lowering the quality of a portfolio. In many
cases investors who remained had had to accept unusually large losses by in
effect compensating the early sellers. The combination of mispricing and
ability to exit easily was an unforeseen consequence because previously high
transactions costs in property trading had thwarted short term selling. When
the property market did recover later in the decade, investors were more
circumspect when considering unit trusts.
7
Conclusion
The property boom and bust in the
early 1970s cannot be blamed on the Conservative Government and Bank of England
alone. Institutional demand for commercial property had been incentivised by upward-only
rent reviews, particularly in an inflationary environment. Earlier changes in
policy had created the foundation for upward shocks to property prices: severe
development restrictions in the South East, anomalies from changes in taxation
and the creation of a whole-sale money market open to the secondary banking
sector. In effect an extraordinary confluence of specific property shocks and
macroeconomic events culminated in the speculative bubble following the 1972
budget. The Bank of England was complacent about C+CC due to a long, uninterrupted
period of safe banking but at least recognised early an overheating economy. Lack
of independence prevented the Bank asserting authority but considerable kudos
was regained by adept handling of the secondary banking crisis.
Britain was not the only country
that experienced an investment boom in 1972/1973. The world economy had grown
quickly, and other countries’ policy makers had underestimated the inflationary
environment following the breakdown of Bretton Woods. However there were two strategies
that reflect badly on the Conservative Government and Heath in particular. Firstly,
the Government naively concluded that capital formation from cutting taxes,
protecting wages from price increases and consenting to easier credit would primarily
benefit industry. Secondly, the volte-face in economic policy; the Government
had prepared for four years a policy of disengagement only to reverse course
when public opinion changed. Heath had chosen to reject party policy to manage
the economy and prioritise growth and employment with little concern for
inflation and the balance of payments. This was particularly lamentable as many
sources suggest Heath often ignored prescient advice from the Bank of England, Treasury
and his own Cabinet.
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[1]
Harris, R. and Sewill, B. (1975) British Economic Policy 1970-1974; Two views p.31
[2]
Kirby, M. (1991) in Crafts, N., and Woodward, N; The British Economy since 1945
p.251
[3]
Capie, F (2010) The Bank of England 1950s to 1979
p. 324
[4]
Harris and Sewill, Op. cit., p.31
[5]
Holmes, M (1997) The Failure of the Heath
Government p.9
[6] Ibid.,
p.11
[7] Campbell, J (1993) Edward Heath: A Biography
p.266
[8] Holmes Op. cit., p.40, Kirby Op. cit., p.250
[9] Coopey, R. and Woodward, N (1996) Britain
in the 1970s: The Troubled Economy
p. 121
[10] The
Economist 4 April 1972
[11] Coopey and Woodward Op. cit.,
p.40
[12] Ibid., p.39
the Act “provided the most comprehensive armoury of Government control
that has ever been assembled for use over private industry”
[13] Nixon closed the Gold window and the dollar
fell sharply against all major currencies.
[14] Holmes,
Op. cit., p.46
[15] Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin (BEQB) 2 June 1972 p. 179
pp. 226-238
[16] Holmes,
Op. cit., p.44
[17] Capie,
Op. cit., p.512
[18] Reid, M. (1982) The
Secondary Banking Crisis, 1973-1975
p.70
[19] Broackes, N. (1979) A
Growing Concern p.221
[20] Campbell
(1993) op. cit., p.523
[21] Brittan, S
(1977) The Economic Consequences
of Democracy p.9
[22] Blackaby, F
(1978) British Economic Policy
1960-1974 p.64
[23] The Financial
Times 22 March 1972 p.1
[24] Ibid p.8
[25] Ibid p.9
[26] Reid,
Op. cit., p.24
[27] Ibid
p.25
[28] Capie,
Op. cit. p. 484, p.524
[29] Ibid p. 427
[30] Dimsdale,
Op. cit., p.118
[31] BEQB
June 1971 p.196
[32] The Economist 22 May 1972
p.75
[33] Capie,
Op. cit., p.506
[34] Scott, P and Judge, G (2000) Cycles
and Steps in British Commercial Property Values
[35]
Interview with Jonathan Harris:
President of the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors 2000/2001 (see
bibliography for brief résumé)
[36] Harris. Op. cit.
[37] The Economist
7 November 1964. “Full Stop for London Offices”
[38] Scott, P (1996) The Property Masters: A History of the British Commercial Property
Sector. p.167
[39] Estates
Gazette 1 April 1972 p.93
[40] Hamnett, C and Randolf, B (1988) Cities Housing and Profits pp. 107-109, 126
[41] Scott,
Op. cit., p.184
[42] Investors
Chronicle April 7 1972.
[43] Opinion
of the Lords of Appeal for Judgment; Regina v. Secretary of State 7
December 2000.
[44] Hamnett and Randolf, Op .cit., p. 103
[45] Hamnett and Randolph, Op. cit., p.113
[46] Slater, J (1977) Return
to Go p.100
[47] Capie, Op. cit., p.559
[48] Kiyotaki, N and Moore, J (1997) Credit
Cycles
[49] The
Economist 27 January 1973 p. 56 What Price Land for Housing?
[50] Coopey and Woodward, Op. cit., p.1
[51] Ibid.,
p.110
[52] BEQB June 1972
p.163
[53] Campbell, Op. cit., p527
[54] Calomiris, C (2009) Banking
Crises and the Rules of the Game.
[55]
Campbell, Op. cit., p.531
[56] Property
Week 21 September 2007 p.38; Quote
from Mike Slade, CEO of Helical Bar.
The Times
30 November 2004. Obituary of Ronald Lyon.
[57] Scott, Op. cit., p. 195
[58] Plender, J (1982) That’s the way the money goes
p.97
[59] Slater,
Op. cit., p 152
[60] Ibid,
p 120
[61] The
Banker April 1972 p.433
[62] BEQB December 1973 p.445
[63] Veblen, T (1904) The Theory of Business Enterprise p.54
[64] Estates
Gazette 1 April 1972
[65] Crafts and Woodward, Op. cit., p.251
[66] Coopey and Woodward, Op. cit., p.1
[67] BEQB
table, 8 March 1972, March 1974.
Nationwide Housing index: End 1973, 1971 average prices.
[68] Reid, Op. cit., p. 75
[69] Ibid p.76
[70] For example see Coopey and Woodward p.251
[71] Capie, Op. cit., pp. 773-775.
[72] BEQB
December 1972 p 517
[73] Calomiris, C (2009) Banking Crises and the Rules of the Game.
[74] Simon, J (2003 Three Australian Asset-price Bubbles.
[75] Plender, Op.cit., pp. 96-97
[76] Scott, Op.cit., p.186
[77]
The Economist: 10 March 1973
[78] Capie, Op. cit., p. 534. On 30 November 30
share- trading was suspended in London and County.
[79] Reid, Op. cit., p. 82 and Capie, Op. cit., p. 534
[80]
Healey, D (1989) The Time of my Life
p. 374
[81] Capie, Op. cit., p. 530. It is also worth
noting that rising interest rates in 1973 would create even more expensive
borrowings for SCOOP when it was time to honour their commitment to buy the
extra CDs.
[82] Reid, Op. cit., p. 27. It is interesting to note that Reid had
concluded that “matching” was relatively little understood even at the time of
publication (1982). This was confirmed in the April 2011 interview with Harris.
[83] This is called a positive yield curve. A
negative yield curve is where short term rates are higher than longer term
rates
[84] BEQB
September 1973 p.309
[85] Capie, Op. cit., p.538
[86] Ibid, p. 537 Chapter 1 of Reid (1982) further
describes the meeting.
[87] The
Economist 5 January 1974.
[88] Capie, Op. cit., pp. 548-9
[89] Sir Kenneth Cork was senior partner of W.J.
Cork Gulley the largest insolvency practice in Britain.
[90] Interview:
Jonathan Harris
[91] Bank
of England File 6A.70/3 on Slater Walker.
[92] Capie, Op. cit., p. 562
[93] Capie, Op.cit.,p.586, Reid, Op. cit., p. 193, Slater, Op. cit., p.
199, Healey, Op. cit., p.375 and interview
with Harris.
[94] Scott, Op. cit.,p.198. A Solvency level is the excess of assets over
liabilities.
[95] The
Times 21 August 1974 p.15 and Property Week 25 September 2009 p.22
[96] Plender, Op. cit., p. 89 Note that 13.6% compounded over the 1970s
represented a 258% increase in prices.
[97] Capie, Op. cit., p. 551 and Slater,
Op. cit., p. 206
[98] Interview:
Jonathan Harris.